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Western democracies have increasingly deployed an extensive range of participatory and deliberative 
institutions. However, our empirical knowledge about the outcomes of such practices is scarce, as it is 
the effect of contextual factors on such outcomes. As a result, we do not know much about how a 
dramatic economic downturn such as the recent financial crisis could have affected the characteristics 
and success of participatory processes. This research addresses the impact of the Great Recession on 
institutionalised forms of public participation organised or sponsored by public authorities. As far as 
we know, there are no other comparable studies that take on the question of how such a significant 
shift in political and economic context impacts on what is a relatively novel aspect of our political 
landscape. Our research question, therefore, reads as follows: how has the financial crisis affected the 
practice and results of local institutions of participatory governance? 
Our analysis is focused on participation processes organised by local authorities in Spain (as 
such, independent social movement activity is not considered). These processes are formalised 
activities where citizens are involved in the discussion or making of public decisions. Such processes 
range from well-resourced participatory budgeting to less structured neighbourhood councils and ad-
hoc public consultations. We have selected Spain as our geographical focus as it is one of the Southern 
European countries where the effect of the crisis has been most severe and where most major policy 
areas have been substantially (sometimes radically) transformed. Given the strength of the external 
shock, the effect on participatory governance is likely to be more extensive. 
This paper is ground-breaking in at least two ways. First, most of the analysis of the effect of 
the crisis in Southern Europe has focused on the impact on national and regional level policy. Much less 




































































is known about the impact on the local level, where it is likely that austerity policies and financial cuts 
have been more heterogeneous amongst the approximately 8,000 Spanish municipalities. Our analysis 
contributes to this relatively unexplored field of the local effects of the crisis. 
Secondly, we know more about the reactions of governments to the economic crisis, but little 
on how the crisis impacts on citizens as contributors to policy making. In the face of economic 
recession, do citizens place more pressure on these local institutions or moderate their demands in 
recognition of limited available resources? Our analysis offers an initial opportunity to shed light on 
these significant questions. 
This paper aims to extend our understanding of the context of citizen participation and, more 
particularly, of the impact of the economic crisis. It draws on an innovative dataset that gathers and 
tracks the proposals emerging from participatory exercises organised by Spanish local authorities in 
three Spanish regions between 2007 and 2011. We exclude 2009 from the analysis to clearly 
differentiate the crisis and pre-crisis contexts. This database has (at least) two key virtues in respect of 
our research questions. First, its unit of analysis is proposals that have emerged from participatory 
processes developed in municipalities. This guarantees a large number of observations at the proposal-
level (N=501), as well as a degree of diversity in the characteristics of the participatory processes, the 
municipalities in which they were held and the proposals that were recommended and then 
implemented. The second virtue is that the participatory processes analysed by the project cover the 
period when the economic crisis emerged most visibly. This allows us to distinguish those processes 
that were developed during the period before the impact of the crisis (up to 2008) and those where the 




































































methodologically sophisticated in the way in which we analyse the data: four different but 
complementary analytical strategies are brought to bear to ensure the robustness of findings. 
The next section discusses how and why a significant economic crisis could be expected to 
affect participatory processes organised by local administrations, making the argument that we can 
reasonably expect at least moderate changes in the field. The article moves on to explain the 
methodological strategy and the analysis of our two outcomes of interest – proposal characteristics and 
their final implementation – using four complementary verification strategies. Finally, the article closes 
with a discussion of the implications of the results for both the field of local participation and for the 
analysis of the crisis effects in Southern Europe and beyond. 
 
Public participation: Even more challenging in the event of an economic crisis? 
The expanding literature on participatory processes has evolved from a focus on single, exemplary 
case-studies (for example participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre) to a consideration of a wide array of 
practices. This has allowed researchers to categorise more effectively the variety of processes that 
enable citizens to participate in public decisions. But the day-to-day reality of public participation is not 
well served by comparisons with exemplary cases (Spada and Ryan, 2017). For example, the 
importation of participatory budgeting into Europe has been a highly differentiated process where 
generally the results have been very different from the earlier Brazilian experience (Sintomer et al, 
2008). The focus on the mundane, everyday use of participation by municipalities provides quite 
different insights from the earlier analysis of exemplary cases (Galais et al, 2012). This work provides 




































































2005). Moreover, large N studies and comparative analysis of participatory processes have begun to 
isolate the various explanatory factors of the quality and success of participation, taking into account 
the increasing variety of contexts and circumstances in which such participatory processes are 
established (Newig et al, 2013; Pogrebinschi and Samuels, 2014; Font et al, 2014; Font et al, 2018). 
The financial crisis is clearly one among a wide array of factors that may condition the nature 
and fate of proposals made by citizens and, by extension, the whole participatory process. However, the 
effects of the crisis on public participation has not been the subject of systematic academic attention. In 
the words of Åström et al (2013: 34), previous studies on participatory innovations ‘have focused 
foremost on the influence of institutional and systemic factors’, while ‘largely ignoring or overlooking 
crisis, a concept that has had a central position in other related fields of social scientific research 
interested in innovations in government and society’. 
Only a minority of works address the role that economic constraints may have in the 
development of participatory governance. A study based on five Spanish and Italian regions concludes 
that political determinants (political choices, conflicts and priorities) are more important than social 
and economic determinants in explaining the implementation of participatory processes (Font et al, 
2014). This suggests that political will can overcome the impact of the crisis on participatory 
governance. But money also matters. For instance, we know that financial support is acknowledged as a 
central issue to the success of participatory budgeting (PB). It is thanks to the institutional and financial 
support offered by institutions such as the World Bank, UNESCO and the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) that many PBs have flourished in the last twenty years (Zamboni, 




































































economic constraints. In Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte citizens have taken politically unpopular 
decisions, such as raising local taxes, in order to improve the financial context (Souza, 2001; Zamboni, 
2007). Most participatory methodologies involve direct interaction between citizens and public 
servants and there is a line of argument that suggests that in such contexts, citizens become more 
sensitive to the needs of bureaucracy (rather than the other way around): a form of ‘incorporation of 
the lay public into official institutions’ (Newman et al, 2004: p. 212). 
On the other hand, previous research has also shown that citizens may harden their positions 
as a result of an economic crisis. After 1979, social movements in Brazil claimed more autonomy from 
the state, presenting their demands as rights rather than favours and strengthening their opposition to 
the authoritarian government. This is considered to be the product of the aggravation of economic 
external constraints (Sallum 1996: p. 90). In the recent Great Recession, Morlino and Quaranta (2016) 
have shown that citizens have become more sensitive about what government delivers, assessing their 
responsiveness more negatively in a context of limited public resources. Similarly, Åström and 
colleagues (2013) explain that the economic and political crisis in Iceland led to innovative and 
challenging e-participation initiatives at the national level and also in the city of Reykjavik. In the local 
Southern European context, research on this issue has been limited, but a combination of new types of 
protest activities mixed with social innovation and platforms for social reciprocity have been observed 
as a result of the multidimensional and structural crisis (Blanco and León, 2017). In a broader sense, 
the crisis has generated new social movements and political parties in Spain (Martí-Costa and Tomàs, 




































































It is not clear whether participatory practices evolve differently in the context of a financial 
crisis, or if citizens involved at that moment moderate their demands or push them further, taking 
advantage of the weakness of authorities. We might expect that, unlike processes involving the central 
or federal state, citizens will empathise more with local authorities, particularly those that have 
organised or supported participatory initiatives. Citizens’ involvement in decision making means that 
they are likely to better understand the financial situation of the municipality and to take this into 
consideration in making proposals. 
Approaching the issue from the perspective of local authorities, the outcome of participatory 
processes will be affected by the authority’s attitude and behaviour. Ballester and Lacroix (2016) found 
the Great Recession to be a crucial factor in undermining the continuation of participatory processes in 
the Ebro River Basin in Spain and the Tucson Basin in the United States. The uniqueness of this work is 
particularly striking given the enormous attention that the Great Recession has received as a potential 
burden or explanatory factor for a wide array of public policies (Petmesidou and Guillén, 2014; Natali 
and Stamati, 2014). 
Extending Ballester and Lacroix’s findings, we can expect the Great Recession to negatively 
affect how citizens’ proposals are dealt with by local authorities, ultimately hampering their chances of 
implementation. In the event of an economic recession public authorities are likely to feel compelled to 
protect basic services and restrict expenditure in their response to participation which is often seen as 
peripheral or even superfluous activity. The significance of external shocks may be stronger in a 
relatively novel and poorly institutionalised form of political activity. We might reasonably expect such 




































































down’ in an attempt to protect core activities rather than respond to proposals coming from peripheral 
participatory spaces. In other words, in times of crisis public authorities will implement fewer demands 
from citizens arising from participatory processes. 
An alternative hypothesis running in the opposite direction suggests that economic crisis 
increases the complexity of governance for municipal authorities and leads to further deterioration in 
trust, given that financial constraint equates to reductions in service delivery. Under such 
circumstances, the authorities may seek to involve citizens further as a response to increased 
complexity and to enhance the legitimacy of decisions (Warren, 2009) – or as a way of shifting the 
responsibility of approving service cuts, as has happened in Central and Northern European 
participatory budgeting (Sintomer et al, 2008). A financially disciplined participatory praxis could 
result in more limited proposals that are more likely to be implemented than in other periods. 
There is also room for the null hypothesis. Probably, the strongest argument for no major 
alteration in participatory dynamics is that citizens’ proposals and funding requirements that emerge 
through participatory processes are so limited compared to core service provision that they are not a 
relevant place to make substantial financial cuts. In this interpretation, it would be precisely the 
peripheral role that these processes play in policy making, in Spain (Talpin, 2011; Font et al, 2014) or 
any other polity, that makes them less vulnerable to crisis effects. 
The next section presents the strategy we adopt in order to reveal the effects of the economic 
downturn on the outcome of participatory processes (namely, the implementation of proposals) and on 





































































Context, research design and methodology 
Citizens’ proposals that emerge from participatory processes are our unit of observation. The analysis 
of the ‘fate’ of proposals made by citizens allows us to gain more insight into the decisiveness of 
participatory processes, the attitudes of local government towards citizen engagement, and the degree 
of power that citizens wield. Indeed, whether proposals are implemented, modified or rejected offers 
an insight into the legitimacy of participation in the eyes of public authorities. It also enables us to 
empirically test sceptical conceptions of participatory processes as artefacts conceived to reduce 
conflict with authorities (Newman et al, 2004) or as processes steered at distance by local government, 
which only accepts the outcomes that do not challenge its agenda (Hoppe, 2011). From a different 
perspective, the focus on the nature of proposals brings the analysis into dialogue with critics of 
participation who are concerned that demands of citizens will be excessive and unrealistic, placing 
unnecessary strain on the capacity of public authorities to govern effectively (Schumpeter, 1976; 
Fiorina, 1999). 
As for the context in which these proposals emerge, our analysis is limited to policy proposals 
emanating from local participatory processes in one country: in this case Spain. Spanish local 
governments are elected every four years and are in charge of about 12 per cent of total public 
spending. Even if they provide a significant number of services and functions to local residents, their 
level of autonomy in performing such task is more limited than in other European countries. This is 
due, among other reasons, to the distinction between ‘own’ and ‘delegated’ competences and to the fact 
that an important share of their revenues comes from transfers from other administrations that have to 




































































autonomy was further restricted in 2013, with the approval of Law 27/2013 that tries to limit their 
expenses and debt. Its effects are significant in the provision of some public services, even if most 
municipalities continue to develop similar programs through a lax interpretation of its mandate (Boix 
Palop, 2015). 
The participatory processes developed by Spanish municipalities have evolved from a limited 
system built around advisory councils in the late eighties (Navarro, 2004) to a much more diverse 
ecology. Such processes may be more extensive and methodologically more plural, but their decision-
making capacities continue to be quite limited, often focused on relatively minor decisions rather than 
major local policies (Talpin, 2011; Font et al, 2014). Under the early advisory council model, the main 
actors were primarily local associations, but more recent initiatives have diversified the range of 
participants to include individual citizens. These developments in participatory governance have 
emerged from an environment where concern with corruption and lack of confidence in political 
institutions is quite widespread (Villoria et al, 2012), but also political interest and willingness to 
become involved in participatory processes increased substantially (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2017). 
In this study then, contextual variation is limited to the municipalities and regions of Spain in 
which participatory processes were undertaken. No fully representative frame of local participatory 
processes exists in any country, so our aim was to ensure diversity of participatory processes from 
which to analyse proposals. Our initial sampling frame is a quite diverse collection of participatory 
processes developed in three Spanish regions: Andalusia, Catalonia and Madrid1. 
We use a time frame from one local election (2007) to the next (2011) with fieldwork taking 




































































implementation of citizens’ proposals, but also that memories and administrative records are recent 
enough to be tracked. Since our goal is to analyse what happens to proposals we focus only on those 
participatory processes that produce a list of recommendations2. Since we lack a comprehensive list of 
participatory processes, our sample cannot be taken as representative of the totality of Spanish activity, 
but rather presents a close approximation of activity in the three regions (Font et al, 2106). The 
population for our study is, thus, the proposals from the processes developed by municipalities in these 
three regions during the period 2007-2011. We include in our population a number of proposals that 
resulted from participatory processes in 2005 and 2006, but where the implementation process by the 
local authority had not begun until 2007 or later. 
Since it is quite likely that different proposals emerging from the same participatory process 
are treated differently by local governments, we tracked the evolution of each proposal to understand 
whether there are factors at the proposal level which are systematically associated with their fate 
(extent of implementation). From the initial datasets, a total of 403 participatory processes that 
produced proposals were organised in these regions during our temporal frame. The final selection of 
participatory processes is not intended to depict a fully representative sample of all participatory 
processes that existed between 2007 and 2011, but to guarantee enough variation in terms of context 
(that is region and city size) and types of participatory methodology.  A strategy of stratified random 
sampling was used with four variables –region, municipality size, process design and previous 
participatory experience– as classification criteria and random selection within each of these strata. 
Table 1 shows the final sample composition3. 




































































For each of the processes we produced a list of all the proposals that were agreed by 
participants. In order to avoid excessive weighting in the final sample towards processes with 
hundreds of proposals, we coded a maximum of 20 randomly selected proposals per process –and all 
proposals when the number was lower than 20. Whenever a process generated more than 20 
proposals, but these had been ordered in a stratified format (for example in thematic issue packages as 
is often the case in Agenda 21), we proportionally (relative to the size of each stratum) and randomly 
selected proposals from each list. Next, we tracked the fate of each proposal though a combination of 
official documents and records and with interviews with officials in the local administration and other 
informants from civil society or the local political sphere, with an average of 4.2 interviews per 
participatory process. 
The variety of sources accessed to retrieve the information as well as their different degree of 
quality and willingness to cooperate meant that there were important differences in the quality of the 
information collected. In order to be able to account for this, we excluded those proposals for which we 
did not have sufficiently reliable data (38 proposals). 
The final database used here includes 501 observations corresponding to proposals stemming 
from 34 processes in 22 municipalities. For each observation, we have information about more than 40 
variables characterising each proposal, the participatory process from which it emerged and the 
municipality that held or sponsored the participatory initiative. 
For the purposes of the current research we are mainly interested in three dependent 
variables: (a) the fate of proposals – to test the impact of the crisis on the attitude of the local 




































































proposals; and (c) whether or not the proposals are challenging in nature – in order to check if citizens 
adapted their demands as a result of the Great Recession. The fate of proposals takes three possible 
values: first, full implementation of the proposal with no or minimal changes; secondly, the range of 
intermediate situations, from significant changes to the proposal in implementation to partial 
implementation; and thirdly, proposals that were rejected or abandoned by the local administration. 
Approximately one third of the proposals belong to each of these categories. The second dependent 
variable, the budgeted cost of proposals, establishes if implementation entails a high, medium, small or 
no investment on the part of the local administration. Finally, the challenging nature of a proposal 
captures whether it entailed change to the local government’s current course of action and practices, 
according to the perceptions of the local interviewees (Table 2). 
The main explanatory variable of change in any of these three variables is the economic crisis. 
We have operationalised the crisis following two different strategies. The first considers the crisis as a 
dichotomous variable, taking the value one for the years affected by the financial strain (2010-2011) 
and zero if the process was held before the Great Recession. It is broadly assumed that the economic 
crisis began in Spain by the end of 2008, but we have considered that changes in participatory 
mechanisms would appear only when crisis effects are clear in society; and these appeared gradually 
during 2009. Since 2009 is therefore not a clear cut off point, but a year in which pre- and post-crisis 
dynamics are likely to be both present, we have excluded this year from the analysis to compare more 
systematically a pre-crisis period with a context where the effects of the crisis are clearly present4. 
Therefore, our dataset contains 195 policy proposals that emerged from 13 different participatory 




































































Additionally, we have approached the crisis from a more quantitative perspective, considering 
it a continuous phenomenon. For this purpose, we have tapped the crisis effects using the 
unemployment rate, the most characteristic recession indicator of the Spanish crisis (Gutiérrez, 2014), 
which moved from an average of about 8.5 per cent in 2007 to a maximum of 26 per cent in 2013. An 
additional reason to select the unemployment rate to track the crisis is that high rates of 
unemployment entail a greater share of the population at risk of poverty which in turn places demands 
for resources and social services on the public administration (including local authorities). The rate of 
unemployment has also been a highly salient issue in the public mind5. 
Our estimations also include a series of controls which we consider as potential explanatory 
factors for the characteristics of citizens’ proposals and their fate6. We have included seven variables 
related to characteristics of the municipality and nine variables tapping the features of the 
participatory processes that spawn the proposals. At the municipality level, we consider economic 
resources (number of inhabitants, income per capita), participatory resources (presence of a 
participation department and a participation plan; number of previous participatory processes 
developed) and political context (government strength, continuity at the political level). We could 
reasonably expect that those municipalities with stronger economic indicators, a more institutionalised 
participatory tradition and more stable political conditions would be less affected by the crisis. Also, 
citizens may adapt their demands (the cost or challenging character of their proposals) to these specific 
local contexts. 
As for the process features, we consider: the type of participatory mechanism (participatory 




































































forum – and other permanent mechanisms – mainly advisory councils); whether the initiative was 
initiated only by the public administration or in partnership with civil society; the number of 
participants; the number of proposals stemming from each process; the presence of other 
administrations involved in the organisation of the process; and the existence of external financial 
support. Although our goal is not to test the role of these factors on the fate and nature of the proposals, 
we expect complex processes (for example strategic planning) to produce more extensive proposals 
that are likely to be more expensive, challenging and difficult to implement. Similarly, for initiatives 
generating a large number of proposals, it would be expected that more would end up not 
implemented. A large number of participants and the involvement of other administrations, on the 
contrary, entails more eyes to oversee the process and hold the local authority accountable for 
implementation. Proposals emerged from processes initiated by citizens themselves are more likely to 
be more challenging in character, but at the same time more likely to be implemented because citizens 
are involved from the very beginning of the process and are thus likely to be more vigilant as to the fate 
of proposals. A generous budget and the existence of third parties funding and overseeing the process 
would also increase the chances of proposals being implemented, even if they are costly or challenging. 
Finally, we include three variables related to responsiveness of the municipality to the 
participatory process that may contribute to potentially explaining the fate of proposals. First, the 
orientation of the public authority towards proposals varies: some designs include a duty on the public 
authority to respond to proposals (‘compulsory’). Second, the timing of a response to participatory 
outcomes varies: in some situations, public authorities provide a public response to the proposals 




































































the extent to which a local authority accepts proposals from citizens: ‘general acceptance’ means that 
the administration makes a general statement accepting all the proposals, although whether it then 
implements them is another matter (technical or cost criteria, for example, may be applied at a later 
date). These different modes of responsiveness must be considered when we analyse the fate of 
proposals. Proposals coming from participatory processes where the requirement of the local 
government to respond is compulsory or the authority has responded immediately and accepted all 
proposals are arguably more likely to be implemented. 
Our goal then is to be certain that the economic crisis had an effect even after controlling for all 
these potentially relevant competing explanations. Table 2 provides a summary of the response 
categories for each one of these dependent, independent and control variables. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
For the data analysis, the impact of the economic crisis is tested in four different and 
complementary ways. First, we show bivariate analysis describing the differences in the dependent 
variables between the years previous to and after the start of the Great Recession. Once the main 
differences have been shown, we estimate a series of multivariate analyses to test the impact of the 
economic context on implementation, cost and challenging character of proposals, controlling by the 
variables discussed above. We show the results operationalising the economic crisis as a continuous 




































































results operationalising the crisis context as a dichotomous variable and considering the public debt as 
an alternative continuous indicator (results not shown but available upon request). We complement 
these regressions with a different type of analysis, an average treatment effect of the crisis. Finally, a 
controlled bivariate comparison is made only considering a subset of our population: those 




In laying out our results, we start by exploring the fate of proposals and the characteristics of their 
content, controlling for crisis context. We then explore the extent to which the fate and the content of 
proposals have changed with the onset of the financial crisis considering simultaneously the role 
played by other potentially influential factors. 
What effect does the crisis context have on the extent of implementation? Differences between 
the pre-crisis and crisis context are shown in Figure 1. A higher percentage of proposals are fully or 
partially implemented before the impact of the crisis, although differences are not statistically 
significant. The main difference appears in the number of proposals that are rejected in the crisis 
context (37.7% as compared to 30.7% before the crisis). This difference is more relevant if we consider 






































































[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Figure 2 indicates that there is a crisis effect on the cost of proposals7, with the crisis context 
reducing costs significantly (65.7% of proposals entailing no or low cost in the crisis context, compared 
to 43.6% before the crisis). What we cannot tell from our analysis is whether this is because the 
agendas of participatory processes are limited to choices between less costly options (structured by 
local administrations) or citizens are modifying their demands (making them less costly) in light of the 
fiscal crisis. 
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
A second question relating to the content of proposals is the extent to which proposals 
represent continuity in local government policy. In other words, in the time of economic crisis, are 
citizens’ proposals more challenging to municipalities? Our analysis shows that most proposals are not 
challenging: they represent a continuity, improvement or innovation that builds on existing policies and 
practices. But within the new context of economic crisis, the challenging character of proposals 
increases: 44.3% are challenging in the crisis period versus 35.4% in the pre-crisis context, a 
significantly different result (Figure 3). While this is likely to be driven primarily by citizens, the agenda 
of a participatory process (primarily driven by the local government) can also shape the dynamics of 




































































emerging adverse economic conditions, pushing for change and criticising local government policy and 
practice. 
 
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
Does the crisis effect remain when we control for process design and municipality level 
variables? First, we present the results of multivariate regression analyses, and then a treatment effects 
analysis to check the robustness of the results. Table 3 presents the estimations for each one of our 
main dependent variables: degree of implementation of the proposals, cost, and challenging character. 
In this case, the proxy to tap the effects of the economic crisis is the unemployment rate. Each 
observation takes the value of the unemployment rate of the year in which the proposals were 
generated. Controlling for the effects of other variables at the municipality and process design levels, a 
worsening of the economic context implies less implementation, cheaper and more challenging 
proposals. We find the same results (not shown) using the public debt as a percentage of the national 
GDP to tap the effects of the crisis or considering the dichotomous variable differentiating the pre-crisis 
and the crisis context. 
 





































































All in all, we see consistent results regardless of the indicator used to tap the economic crisis: 
citizens have adapted their expectations to the new economic context, proposing less costly proposals, 
but ones that are more challenging with regards previous local policies and practices, although the 
latter effect (the challenging nature of proposals) is less significant. Local government has also changed 
its attitude, adopting fewer proposals, possibly due to limited resources, and/or because there are 
more incentives to cherry-pick among proposals those that are less costly. 
The significant crisis effect appears even when we control for a large number of variables. That 
about half of these variables have also significant effects indicates that these are relevant. In fact, 
introducing controls helps to make visible (significant) the crisis effect where it was not so clear in the 
bivariate analysis focused on implementation. 
To check the robustness of our multivariate analyses, we have run a series of treatment effects 
analyses. There are several reasons for taking this approach. First, we can consider the crisis effect as 
an external shock that produces a quasi-experimental situation: there is a ‘control’ group of proposals 
not treated (generated before the crisis) and a treatment group (a series of proposals that emerged 
after the start of the economic downturn). Second, although the OLS estimator of the crisis effects might 
be unbiased, OLS assumes that errors are independent and identically distributed. However, the crisis 
is probably affecting both the outcome and some of the explanatory factors, and therefore this 
assumption no longer holds. Although there are ways to adjust the standard errors, the treatment 
effects approach offers the additional advantage of a simple, straightforward output that focuses 
exclusively on the impact of the crisis and ignores model fit measures and other results that are not as 




































































values for a series of explanatory factors instead of using a linear estimation to model the effects of 
such variables, which relaxes the OLS assumption that these effects should be linear. 
The average treatment effect (ATE) would be equivalent to repeatedly reassigning treatment at 
random, computing each time the difference of means between treated and control groups, then 
averaging them and comparing the differences in means between the two groups. But we cannot 
estimate the average treatment effect by simply subtracting the sample means for the treated and the 
untreated groups with observational data such as ours. In order to compensate for the fact that we are 
dealing with observational, not experimental, data, and therefore the proposals are not randomly 
assigned to the treated (post-crisis) and the control (pre-crisis) group, we must consider a 
methodology that uses covariates to ensure the treatment and the different possible outcomes are 
independent. 
More precisely, we employ the propensity score matching method, which implements the 
propensity scores (PS) estimator. The method uses a logit model to estimate the probabilities of being 
treated using a series of covariates, then matches observations on a single continuous variable (the PS), 
which is the estimated treatment probabilities. Each observation in the control or treated group is 
matched with another individual, the one with the closest value for the propensity score in the opposite 
group. The average treatment effect is computed averaging the difference between the observed and 
potential outcomes for each proposal. 
When considering the relevant covariates, we have only taken into account variables that may 
have influenced simultaneously the treatment and the outcome variables (Grilli and Rampichini, 2011), 




































































In other words, any other variable that may have been affected by the treatment must be omitted. As a 
result, we have excluded from these models all the variables that relate to the features of the 
participatory processes. We have included a series of municipal covariates, as they are stable 
characteristics that were there before the crisis and that may have an impact on the municipal context 
exacerbating the effect of the crisis which started in 2008. 
The list of covariates we consider includes the existence of a participation department and 
participation plan, the number of participatory processes previously developed in the municipality (all 
indicators of an established participatory culture within the local authority), the municipality’s income 
per capita in 2012, its number of inhabitants in 2012, the continuity of the local governing regime and 
the strength of the ruling party/coalition. 
The results of the treatment effects analysis for our three dependent variables are displayed in 
Table 4. We first consider the proposal’s implementation as the outcome. According to our propensity 
score matching, when proposals stem from participatory processes conducted after the crisis, they are 
less likely to be implemented. More precisely, the crisis has a significant effect of –0.31 on the 
implementation variable. As this is a three-category indicator, the coefficient is not directly 
interpretable, but it confirms the negative, significant effect found in the regression analysis. 






































































The next row considers the proposal cost, as measured with our four-category variable (from 
no to high cost). The average treatment effect, obtained using propensity score matching of our treated 
(post-crisis) and untreated (pre-crisis) observations, points at a negative, significant effect. The crisis 
caused a significant reduction in the cost of proposals. Our final analysis considers the challenging 
character of the proposal. The average treatment effect is less significant here, even if the direction of 
the effect is pointing to proposals in the crisis context being more challenging. 
Finally, for illustrating these effects, we have analysed only those municipalities where data is 
available for participatory processes developed before and during the crisis context. In these three 
municipalities, five participatory processes were developed before the impact of the crisis (ending up in 
81 proposals) and three processes during the crisis context (with 56 proposals). This comparison is 
interesting since the crisis effect can be examined holding constant all the local characteristics. Figure 4 
points in the same direction as the previous analyses but shows deeper differences: in the crisis context 
proposals are cheaper, more challenging and less likely to be implemented, and all these differences are 
statistically significant. 
 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
Conclusion 
This paper represents a first step in understanding the effect of the financial crisis on institutions of 




































































period in Spain, one of the European nations that suffered the most extensive impact of economic 
recession, provided an occasion to analyse the impact of this significant external shock on participatory 
processes organised in municipalities. This impact could have at least two faces: it could alter the 
nature of demands made by citizens; and alter government reactions to these proposals. In both cases 
these are relevant research questions that have not been adequately and systematically addressed 
(Blanco and León, 2017). 
Our findings paint an intriguing picture. The financial crisis has had an effect on the way that 
public authorities respond to proposals that emerge from participatory processes: fewer proposals are 
implemented and those that are taken forward are less costly. In other words, governments seem to be 
less able to accept citizens’ demands in a more challenging economic context (Hoppe, 2011) and engage 
more actively in cherry-picking amongst them (Font et al, 2018). But citizens have also adapted their 
behaviour to the new context, putting less costly but more challenging proposals on the table. This 
contradicts common assumptions that citizens will make excessive and unreasonable demands 
(Schumpeter, 1976; Achen and Bartels, 2016). Citizens do adapt their expectations to the adverse 
economic context, putting forward less expensive proposals, but in so doing, challenging the municipal 
authorities to do things differently: to change their established policies and practices. These results 
suggest a degree of sophistication in citizens’ judgements that democratic realists are prone to ignore. 
We cannot rule out that these changes are not due to adaptation of citizens’ judgements but are instead 
driven by changes in the framing of the participatory processes and other interventions on the part of 
public authorities. However, this alternative perspective is less likely to explain why more challenging 




































































The evidence in favour of the two central findings of this paper appears robust given that they 
are the product of four different verification strategies, using different variables and model 
specifications. This does not mean that the change has been dramatic. In fact, compared to other policy 
areas (pensions, health, poverty, banking) or to other political arenas (national or regional) where 
changes have been more profound, participatory governance appears to have suffered less of a radical 
transformation in this period. Participatory processes continue to be developed and some, but not all, 
proposals continue to be implemented by local authorities, just at a lower rate than before the crisis 
years. One explanation of this finding is that the scope of participatory governance remains relatively 
marginal in most Southern European cities (Talpin, 2011; Font et al, 2014) and beyond (Baiocchi and 
Ganuza, 2017)8. In most cases, major policies and major budgets remain unaffected by participatory 
processes and as such this type of practice may survive with only small adaptations during a large 
external shock. Whether the experience of participatory governance can be generalised to other 
relatively peripheral activities and policy areas in local administrations is an open question that only 
further research can answer. 
There is also further research to be undertaken on how continuing crisis conditions can affect 
participatory politics. Our focus was on the period immediately after the crisis began, but the political 
conditions for local participation in Spain altered quite radically as an indirect effect of the changing 
economic and social landscape: the emergence of new political candidacies (coalitions including 
Podemos) that won local elections in 2015 in many of Spain’s largest cities are developing more 
ambitious policies towards participatory democracy (Font, 2017; Nez, 2018). In other European 




































































consequences that we capture in our analysis and the impact of longer term political changes may point 
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1 The selection of these three regions allows us access to two extensive and diverse datasets. A more detailed 
explanation of the data collection method used in this paper is available in Font et al (2016). The details of the initial 
data collection process appear in Galais et al (2012) and Font et al (2014). The three regions selected introduce 
substantial contextual variation since they include quite different levels of development as well as very different regional 
participation policies (Sintomer and Del Pino, 2014). 
2 This set of proposals can include general ideas (for example develop a more egalitarian city), as well as specific policies 
or actions such as the improvement of a specific street or organising a summer school for children. 
3 Where it became clear that we were not able to achieve enough local cooperation to collect most of the information, 
then a participatory process was substituted randomly by another case in the same strata. This happened in only three 
cases where a full list of proposals was lacking and in nine due to lack of cooperation. 82% of the initial cases that were 
eligible ended up in the final sample. All details of the case selection and substitution criteria used appear in Font et al 
(2016). 
4 Results including 2009 as part of the crisis period are very similar to those reported here (totalling 39 participatory 
processes and 571 proposals when including this year). 
5 Note that unemployment rates at the municipal level are impossible to calculate in Spain, as public data on the number 
of citizens belonging to the active population seeking work are not provided at the municipal level. Citizens are more 
aware of national unemployment rates, not local ones. Indeed, the CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) surveys 
confirm that unemployment is through all this period the ‘most important problem’ on the Spanish public agenda. In 
January 2005 this is mentioned as the ‘main national problem’ by 58% of citizens. It decreases until March 2007, the 
lowest point in the series (35%).  From then, it increases again, until reaching scores higher than 80 per cent in 2010 and 
remaining stable during 2010 and 2011. Note as well that the unemployment variable in our models takes a different 
value per year. Thus, we have variables measured at the proposal level (our three dependent variables, N=501), at the 
process level (N=34), at the municipal level (N=22) and at the year level (N=7, from 2005 to 2011). This apparently 
nested structure suggests a multilevel approach to the analysis of the data, yet they are not perfectly ‘pyramidal’. 
Indeed, our data do not comply with the rule of thumb regarding the minimum, safe number of units at each level of the 
analyses, which should ideally be 30 or higher (Maas and Hox, 2005). Alternative models to those presented in this 
paper clustering standard errors by participatory process or municipality do not affect the significance of the effects 
found for unemployment. Finally, we have alternatively estimated multilevel models where the participatory process is 
the second level. The standard errors increase in some instances and four coefficients are no longer significant: the 
effect of unemployment on the challenging character of proposals; type: other temporary on implementation; external 




































































                                                                                                                                                    
6 For a more extensive review of factors potentially affecting the fate of proposals see Font et al (2018).   
7 The information we have is the estimated final cost of implementation of the proposal (even if not implemented). As 
such it can include modifications introduced in planning and implementation stages by the administration. 
8 Further research on the Spanish case is needed to explore whether our main findings hold in light of the effect of the 







































































Note: Differences between the pre-crisis and crisis context are not statistically significant.  
Figure 1
Figure 2. Estimated Cost of Proposals Before and During Crisis Context (%) (N = 431)  
 
Notes: Includes the estimated cost of all proposals, including those not accepted by local authorities.  
Differences are statistically significant at 0.01 level (Cramer’s V = 0.225).  
 
Figure 2
Figure 3. Challenging Character of Proposals Before and During Crisis Context (%) (N = 487)  
 
Note: Differences are statistically significant at 0.1 level (Cramer's V = 0.088).  
 
Figure 3
Figure 4. Degree of Implementation, Cost and Challenge Character of Proposals by Crisis Context (Only 
Municipalities with Information of Pre and Crisis Context) (N = 135, 132, 136)  
 
Note: Differences are statistically significant at 0.001 level for implementation (Cramer’s V = 0.316); cost (Cramer's V 
= 0.384) and challenge (Cramer's V = 0.299). 
 
Figure 4
Table 1. Accomplished Sample Composition 
 
Selected cases Number of proposals 
n % n % 
Region 
Andalusia 17 50.0 268 53.5 
Catalonia 8 23.5 130 25.9 
Madrid 9 26.5 103 20.6 
Municipality size 
Less than 5,000 3 8.8 39 7.8 
5,000 to 10,000 5 14.7 77 15.4 
10,001 to 20,000 4 11.8 59 11.8 
20,001 to 50,000 6 17.6 96 19.2 
More than 50,000 16 47.1 230 45.9 
Process design 
Participatory budgeting 6 17.6 117 23.4 
Strategic planning 13 38.2 241 48.1 
Other permanent 7 20.6 65 13.0 
Other temporary 8 23.5 78 15.6 
Previous participatory experience 
One or two processes 10 29.4 111 22.2 
Three or more processes 24 70.6 390 77.8 
Total 34 100.0 501 100.0 
 
Table 1
Table 2. Description of the Variables Analysed 
Dependent Variables Analysed Variable categories or ranges Mean SD 
Degree of implementation of the 
proposal: the final fate of the proposals 
- Rejected = 1 
- Partially implemented/ implemented with 
modification = 2 
- Fully implemented without modification = 3 
1.986 0.829 
Estimated costs of proposals, 
differentiating whether they imply 
infrastructure construction work (CW) 
or not 
- No cost = 0 
- Low (<50.000 € for CW and < 18.000 € for the 
rest) = 1 
- Intermediate (50.001 to 200.000 CW and from 
18.001 to 60.000) = 2 
- High (>200.000 € for CW and more than 60.000 
for the rest) = 3 
1.478 1.086 
Challenging character of the proposals 
according to prevailing policy action 
- Does not challenge existing policy positions 
(continuity) = 0 
- Challenges existing policies and practices = 1 
0.409 0.492 
Independent Variable Analysed (crisis) Variable categories or ranges  
Unemployment rate (%) Quantitative (from 8.5% to 26%) 16.195 5.927 
Controls regarding municipality Variable categories or ranges  
Inhabitants Quantitative (from 4,229 to 3,233,527) 3.800 1.362 
Income per capita Quantitative (from 503.59 to 1,655.3) 3.669 1.664 
Participation Department No = 0 / Yes = 1 0.918 0.274 
Participation Plan No = 0 / Yes = 1 0.679 0.467 
Number of participatory processes 
previously developed 
1 experience; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6 or more experiences 
3.645 1.753 
Government strength 
- Minority government (one or several parties) = 
1 
- Coalition government (with majority support) = 
2 
- Single-party majority government = 3 
1.491 0.575 
Continuity at political level (after 2011 
local election) 
-Clear government change = 1 
-Partial continuity (mayor or most important 
party in government remains) = 2 
-Complete continuity (same mayor and 
party/coalition) = 3 
2.329 0.835 
Controls related to participatory 
processes 
Variable categories or ranges 
 
Type of participatory process  
- Participatory Budgeting. No = 0 / Yes = 1 0.234 0.424 
- Strategic planning (reference category in table 
3. No = 0 / Yes = 1 
0.481 0.500 
- Other temporary experiences. No = 0 / Yes = 1 0.130 0.336 
- Other permanent experiences. No = 0 / Yes = 1 0.156 0.363 
Initiative of the process 
The initiative for starting the participatory 
process emerged from the civil society. No = 0 / 
Yes = 1 
0.980 0.140 
Number of participants 
Less than 10 = 1; 10-24 = 2; 25-49 = 3; 50-99 = 4; 
100-299 = 5; 300-499 = 6; 500-1,000 = 7; more 
than 1,000 = 8 
5.224 2.112 
Number of proposals Quantitative (from 1 to 131) 51.735 32.854 
Other administration involved No = 0 / Yes = 1 0.474 0.500 
External financial help No = 0 / Yes = 1 0.568 0.496 
Responsiveness: the 







- Compulsory = 3 
- Recommendation = 2 





No = 0 / Yes = 1 0.820 0.385 
General 
acceptance 
- No = 0 
- Yes, some proposals accepted = 1 
1.046 0.642 
Table 2
of proposals - Yes, all proposals accepted = 2 
 
Table 3. Explanatory Factors of Implementation Degree, Cost and Challenging Character of Proposals 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
OLS regressions for implementation and cost, logistic regression for challenging. We have replicated the same 
regression analyses measuring the economic level in two different ways. First, considering the public debt as a 
 Implementation Cost Challenging 
    
Economic level    
Unemployment -0.03** -0.05*** 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Municipality level    
Inhabitants 0.03 -0.00 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) 
Income per capita -0.09+ 0.02 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) 
Participation Department 1.05*** -0.63* -0.14 
 (0.28) (0.32) (0.17) 
Participatory Plan 0.24* -0.44*** -0.07 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.07) 
Number particip. processes -0.05 0.10* -0.06** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Government strength 0.50*** -0.14 -0.15* 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.06) 
Continuity at political level -0.11 -0.79*** 0.11 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) 
Participatory process level  
Type: Participatory budgeting 0.24 0.51* -0.00 
 (0.20) (0.23) (0.12) 
Type: Other permanent -0.88* -1.27** 0.65** 
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.22) 
Type: Other temporary -0.67* -1.02** 0.42* 
 (0.30) (0.35) (0.18) 
Initiative: only public admin. 0.94+ -0.61 -0.19 
 (0.55) (0.63) (.12) 
Number of participants -0.15** -0.08 0.10** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) 
Number of proposals -0.01*** -0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Other administration involved -0.23 0.53* 0.16 
 (0.23) (0.26) (0.14) 
External financial help -0.50+ -0.56 0.19 
 (0.30) (0.34) (0.18) 
Requirement to respond -0.20* -0.07 0.06 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.06) 
Immediate response -0.09 0.07 0.23* 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.10) 
General acceptance 0.15 0.59*** 0.14* 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.06) 
Constant 2.36* 5.60*** -0.67 
 (1.11) (1.28) (0.68) 
R-Squared / Pseudo R-Squared 0.172 0.352 0.105 
Observations 445 449 438 
Table 3
continuous variable, the effects are similar (-.02** on implementation, -.02*** on cost; .04* on challenging). Second, 
considering the crisis as a dichotomous variable (pre and post crisis), we also obtained similar effects (-.33* on 
implementation; -.70*** on cost; .70+ on challenging). Likewise, including 2009, all analyses are  similar, but with a loss 
of significance for the effect of unemployment and public debt on the cost of proposals. 
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.11 .06 1.85 .064 487 
 
Table 4
